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Catharine MacKinnon likes to describe her view as radical
feminism or feminism unmodified or feminism, full stop. And
she likes to contrast it to liberal feminism, which she sometimes
treats with caustic scorn. But is she right to see a contrast here?
That MacKinnon sees one is of course some reason to think
there is one. Not because she has proprietary control over the
substance of her views or what labels are appropriate—how
could she?—but because she’s thought long and hard about
this sort of thing. Still, she could be mistaken. I’ll propose that
she is. More than nominalist labeling is at stake in deciding
whether her views are liberal. We might want to deepen our
grasp of liberalism and of her work. And we might wonder
how promising or doomed her political projects are in a largely
liberal social order.
It’s tempting to construe the question, “Is MacKinnon a
liberal?” as putting all the pressure on properly characterizing
MacKinnon’s views. But it also depends on what we think
liberalism is—or, better, recalling that liberalism is a sprawling
tradition, what family of views is properly described as liberal.
In the span of a short paper, I can’t even begin to do justice to
MacKinnon’s work, let alone to develop and defend a view
on how we might grasp liberalism. But I can draw a cartoon
of each. I’m confident that the cartoon could be turned into a
detailed and nuanced portrait. But it will suffice for my purposes
here if I can supply some reason to pause before agreeing
that MacKinnon is an opponent of liberalism. I think she’s not
even on the fringes of the liberal tradition. I think she’s right at
its heart. And that’s what I think despite her crossing swords
with such figures as Ronald Dworkin and Nadine Strossen of
the ACLU, who see themselves as defending liberalism against
her illiberal assault: for I think they’re confused, too. Theirs are
disputes squarely within the liberal tradition.
***
MacKinnon is not alone in thinking that the public/private
distinction has underwritten the subordination of women. As
she puts it, “liberalism created the private and put the family in
it.”1 And, she thinks, this has made the subordination of women
socially and politically invisible. I’d object to the uncharacteristic
idealism about history that the formulation suggests, but also
to its errant chronology. After all, the public/private distinction
predates liberalism by centuries: the ancient Greeks relied
on it. That aside, I’d urge that there are three public/private

distinctions, not one, and that none of them maps onto the
political/nonpolitical distinction.2
How so? Public sometimes means “visible or accessible to
others,” where the others are strangers; private, then, is hidden
or off limits. As our concepts so often do, this one doubles
between descriptive and normative sense. When your eightyear-old is industriously picking her nose and you snap, “don’t
do that in public!” you mean, “where others can in fact see
you.” But now suppose that your neighbor in the apartment
building discovers—or drills—a hole in the drywall between
his living room and your bathroom. In fact, he can see you in it.
But he shouldn’t be looking. It’s fully idiomatic to say that he’s
intruding on your privacy. That’s the normative gloss. Actual
vision and metaphors of vision spring readily to mind here. But
accessibility is broader than that. A park is public when more
or less anyone can walk in. A country club is private when you
have to be admitted as a member.
Public can also refer to issues on which you’re obliged to
pay heed to the interests of some broader collection of others,
say your fellow citizens; private, then, to issues on which
you may suit yourself. We ordinarily think of your consumer
choices as private. It’s no one else’s business what brand of
peanut butter you prefer. But that can change. If Cesar Chavez
is promoting a grape boycott to help organize the National Farm
Workers, your preference for seedless green grapes might well
be thought to be no longer a private affair.
Finally, public sometimes refers to the government, private
to other social spheres, especially (these days) the market.
Consider asking whether health care should be publicly or
privately funded or supplied.
These distinctions are independent. That something is
public in one sense has nothing to do with whether it’s public
in the other senses. When you buy Skippy peanut butter, other
shoppers can see it in your shopping cart and the store will
keep a digital record of it: it’s public in being visible. But it’s
still private in that you may suit yourself. When you vote, no
one else can see your ballot. But you should pay heed to the
interests of others, to make a judgment on something like the
common good, and not to pursue your self-interest, still less to
do whatever you happen to feel like doing. Firms in a capitalist
economy are private in the sense that they may pursue their
own interests. (But those committed to stakeholders, not
shareholders, deny that this is true.) Those with shares bought
and sold on the stock market are publicly traded: ownership is
open or accessible to strangers. Some of what the government
does is publicly visible and ought to be—and transparency helps
ensure that the government pay proper attention to our interests
and not lapse into contemptible self-dealing. But some of what
the government does is properly hidden: take espionage or
knotty diplomatic negotiations.
None of these distinctions, I’d argue, maps onto the
political/nonpolitical distinction. Suppose we take politics as
the realm of conflict over legitimate authority. That comes in
weaker and stronger forms. The weaker form is struggle over
whether some authority is using her authority well or badly.
The stronger form is struggle over whether the actor actually
has authority at all: maybe she’s exceeding her jurisdiction,
or maybe she’s just an interloper with no legitimate authority
at all. It’s tempting to take the institution of government as
the sole locus of authority. But that’s a mistake. Social life
is shot through with authority. Take bosses and workers,
priests and their flocks, teachers and students, parents and
children, conductors and musicians, and so on. In all those
settings, emphatically including the family, we have conflicts
over legitimate authority. For many centuries, husbands have
asserted authority over wives—and men and women alike
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have argued that that authority is being used badly or that it
doesn’t properly exist at all.
Nor are women or the family private in either of the
first two senses. Sure, some of what happens in your family
happens behind closed doors. But by no means all of it. The
ancient Athenians, again centuries before liberalism, may
have squirrelled away their well-born women behind closed
doors when guests visited. Various illiberal societies around the
globe do more or less the same today—or extend mandatory
invisibility outside the home by imposing the veil, keeping
taverns or tea houses off limits to women, and so on. But much
of family life is and should be open to the inspection of others.
And if on some issues your family or its father and husband may
do what it or he likes, there are issues on which outsiders will
take keen interest and arguably should. Take the exemplary
legal and political struggle over the very possibility of marital
rape. One view was that husbands can’t rape wives because
the marriage ceremony counts as permanent consent. Another,
and I think the more crucial one, was that the state rules not
over individuals as such, but over male heads of household.
“A man’s home is his castle” was a doctrine of public law, not
a squishy cultural sentiment about how glad the wife and kids
are to see the weary warrior or worker return home and hide
behind the newspaper. It meant that he was sovereign over
what happened within those four walls. So the state had literally
no jurisdiction, no authority, to second-guess or punish his
actions there. And that means in turn that the victory of liberal
individualism was a victory for women: it helped make their
mistreatment legally visible.
So far, I’ve relied on conceptual analysis, undergirded with
some stylized examples and fragments of historical information.
One might wonder whether or to what extent liberals grasped
these issues and championed emancipatory possibilities
for women. In The Subjection of Women, John Stuart Mill
announces repeatedly and indignantly that men beat their wives
and get away with it. He wants the reader to see this as a scandal
of the first order. He wants to expose what has been invisible
and unsayable; he wants to turn it into an object of proper public
concern; and he wants to insist on its political importance. And
he insists that norms of male authority depend on nothing better
than a lingering remnant of a long-vanished social world where
physical strength actually mattered. I doubt that that explanation
is plausible, but no matter here. What matters is that Mill means
to unmask male authority as an obsolete absurdity by assigning
it a debunking history.
MacKinnon finds much to admire, and much to be irritated
by, in Mill’s book. I share some of her irritation. When Mill
assures the reader that, after all, the equality of women won’t
dramatically change things, that most women will be happy to
continue in sweet subservience, one wants to groan or hurl the
book against the wall. The best I can say about that notorious
passage is that it can be read, if too generously, as political
strategy. If you’re concerned, as you should be, that dominant
males will try to hang on to their unjust social dominance come
what may, it might be helpful to assure them that actually they
don’t have a whole lot to worry about. Maybe. But I fear that
what’s really going on echoes the strand of On Liberty, which
seems peevishly annoyed with the mindless mediocre Mrs.
Grundys of the world, and Mill is plaintively demanding that
such nonentities leave him and his talented eccentric pals
alone. Or, traditional femininity might be fine for Mrs. Grundy,
but not for Harriet Taylor.
Still, Mill’s work here and elsewhere is splendidly concrete,
grounded in a lively apprehension of actual social life. We
should remember him in part as the seventeen-year-old arrested
for helping the London poor get contraceptives, as the member

of parliament who urged an amendment to the second Reform
Bill that would have extended the vote to women.3 (This
earned “much merriment” and yielded a caricature in Punch
captioned “A Feminine Philosopher.”) Not that you’d have any
idea of such matters from MacKinnon’s sketch. She wraps up
her commentary on Mill this way: “From Mill to contemporary
forms, liberal theory exhibits five interrelated dimensions that
contrast with radical feminist theory, clarifying both. These
are: individualism, naturalism, voluntarism, idealism, and
moralism.”4
I always worry about such abstract isms. But plenty of
liberal theory isn’t what MacKinnon has in mind here: it isn’t
invidiously abstract or ahistorical or anything like that. A staple
left-antiliberal view, which MacKinnon is gesturing toward here,
is that liberalism is a theory of the presocial individual. (Marx’s
On the Jewish Question is the paradigm statement of this view.)
I don’t believe it. I think liberalism is first and foremost a theory
of social order. After the Reformation, it becomes completely
implausible to model social order on consensus on moral
and religious fundamentals. Instead, liberals offer a theory
of social differentiation, on which different institutions have
their own logics and what matters is keeping reasonably crisp
jurisdictional boundaries among them. Thus Locke’s insistence
in the Letter Concerning Toleration that we separate church and
commonwealth: “He jumbles heaven and earth together, the
things most remote and opposite, who mixes these societies,
which are in their original, end, business, and in every thing,
perfectly distinct, and infinitely different from each other.” Locke
was willing to argue that Catholics were unreliable subjects
because they served a foreign prince (the pope), and that
atheists were untrustworthy, too: that last because of his curious
theory of moral motivation, on which people won’t comply with
their obligations unless they fear divine punishment.
But those are quirky inessentials in a view that clearly
grasps the logic of social differentiation, and later liberals were
happy to junk them. So Jefferson, calmer about atheism than
Locke was, breezily adopted a deflating harm principle: “The
legitimate powers of government extend to such acts only as are
injurious to others. But it does me no injury for my neighbor to
say there are twenty gods, or no God. It neither picks my pocket
nor breaks my leg.”5 This line of analysis demotes the inspiring
confessional state, leading its faithful subjects to salvation, to
a pedestrian entity responsible for such humdrum tasks as
providing police and filling potholes. The free individual falls
out much later in the argument, only after this picture of social
order is up and running. The picture explains how there is room
for individuals to make unsupervised choices without causing
chaos. It turns that ominous figure of early modern England,
the masterless man, into the dignified free agent you needn’t
be a Kantian to know and prize.6
So liberalism is sociology way before it can be anything
about individuals. Sure, some liberal theorists like to talk about
natural rights and social contracts. However you construe such
talk, remember that David Hume wrote a History of England, that
Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations and Lectures on Jurisprudence
are richly learned in history, that Benjamin Constant was far
more interested in thinking about the exigencies of French
politics and society during and after the Revolution than he
was in ruminating about individualism, naturalism, voluntarism,
idealism, and moralism. Remember too that plenty of figures
outside the liberal tradition are more or less uninterested in
thinking hard about actual social life. The distinction between
sociological and abstract political theories crosscuts the
distinction between liberals and others.
Liberals too were deeply suspicious of all kinds of rules
allotting wealth, power, and privileges in ways having nothing

— 12 —

— Philosophy and Law —

to do with people’s talent or work. They declared war on
monarchy and aristocracy—recall Tom Paine’s punning sneer at
the “no-ability.” To embrace the career open to talents or equal
opportunity was to embrace a radical attack on familiar legal
disabilities and privileges. How crazy to ban Jews and Catholics
from parliament, as did the English! How absurd to restrict
admission to the bar, as did the French, to those who’d accepted
the Catholic sacraments! How intolerable to think that race
could make people slaves! How pernicious to say that the oldest
son of an aristocrat should inherit wealth and title, beggaring
the rest of the family! Recall Figaro’s blistering address to the
count: “Just because you are a great nobleman, you think you
are a great genius—Nobility, fortune, rank, position! How proud
they make a man feel! What have you done to deserve such
advantages? Put yourself to the trouble of being born—nothing
more. For the rest—a very ordinary man! Whereas I, lost among
the obscure crowd, have had to deploy more knowledge, more
calculation and skill merely to survive than has sufficed to rule
all the provinces of Spain for a century!” No wonder Louis XVI
was offended. Yet it doesn’t take much to realize that gender,
too, has been a system of ascriptive hierarchy, that men have
simply taken the trouble to be born male. Like racism, sexism
was another illegitimate ascriptive status hierarchy, with those
on top basking in illicit privilege and those on the bottom
suffering contempt and exploitation.
So consider now the more pointed exploration of gender
in Montesquieu’s Persian Letters, surely a canonical liberal text.
(If you have a view on which Montesquieu wasn’t a liberal, or
this book isn’t a liberal text, you’d better have a damned good
story about why not. That it says what it does about gender
can’t count as such a story, lest the claim that liberals are blind
to gender domination lapse into an arbitrary stipulation.) The
setup of the book is that Uzbek has left his harem or seraglio
to explore Enlightenment Paris and the West. It’s an epistolary
novel, in which various characters write letters to each other.
We hear different voices; it isn’t always clear what, if anything,
Montesquieu means to endorse. But the central thrust of the
book is crystal clear. In Paris, Uzbek is a humane liberal. He
sees through Parisian complacency and self-congratulation
and unmasks folly and abuse. At home, though, Uzbek is a
tyrant, and his tyranny gets harsher the longer he’s away and
the more restless—and openly defiant—his women become.
And—here’s the crux—the book exhibits his domination of the
seraglio as maximally private and maximally political. Or, put
differently, Uzbek has more or less total power, is totally cruel,
and it’s all totally invisible and no one outside is supposed to
have the slightest interest in it. These women are so private that
if they have to go out in public they are squirrelled away in a
box; no other man is supposed to be able to lay eyes on them.
Only the castrated eunuchs, officially Uzbek’s loyal instruments,
can. Uzbek is unequivocally their ruler. And his fatuous fantasies
are punctured.
Early on, Uzbek writes to Roxana, one of his favorite wives.
In loving and repulsive detail, he recalls his first having sex with
her—or, as it turns out, raping her. (She carried modesty too
far, he says, so he had to take her by force.) Having reminded
her of the struggle—such cluelessness!—he adds that he
cannot believe that she has any other aim but to please him.
But this is very much about the limits of his imagination, not
her deepest essence or yearning. At the book’s close, Roxana
hurls defiance at him. Yes, she sneers, she has been having
an affair: she has defeated the garrison security apparatus of
his seraglio. She may have lived in a state of servitude, she
announces, but she has made herself free; she has reformed
his laws by appealing to the laws of nature. She announces
she is committing suicide, obviously a grim outcome. But
it’s not as though Montesquieu thinks that is how women

should exercise agency. It’s that she refuses to be trapped and
dominated and has only one way out.
Or take the eunuch who writes to Uzbek. Despite being
castrated, he sees masculinity just as MacKinnon does: as a
matter of social domination. “I always remember that I was
born to govern them,” he says, “and it seems to me as if I
recovered my manhood, on every occasion that I have yet to
command them.” To be a man is not to have testicles. It is to
rule women. Political domination in the private sphere, gender
as politics: these are not radical feminist insights unavailable to
witless liberals. They were staked out and explored centuries
ago in canonical texts of classical liberalism. Again, one might
try to show that Mill or Montesquieu wasn’t a liberal, or that the
Subjection or Persian Letters isn’t a liberal text, or that some
startling insights don’t really cohere with liberalism. But that
would be an extraordinarily steep uphill battle.
***
MacKinnon has also indicted law. Far from being neutral or
objective or impartial, she’s urged, the law systematically
embeds a male point of view. That’s why, she thinks, it’s so
hard to secure rape convictions. Like men used to pornography,
the law sees women as sexually available, as always already
consenting. So courts ask for evidence of physical resistance.
They find consent where women are terrified into submitting,
where women are too drunk to resist, and so on. Law’s
systematic bias makes it impossible to grasp what’s actually
going on, not least what in our culture should make us worry
about the preconditions of meaningful consent.
I have nothing nice to say about American criminal law’s
treatment of rape claims. There are other explanatory accounts
of how things have gone so badly wrong: Anne Coughlin has
argued persuasively that the modern law of rape takes shape
when fornication and adultery are illegal. So ordinarily a woman
coming forward to press rape charges is confessing to a crime
but pleading duress in defense. And the criminal law has
always been very hard on that defense, whatever the crime,
whatever the sex of the defendant.7 One might wonder why
the law continues to be so hard on women after we’ve given
up on punishing fornication and adultery. But her explanation
makes better sense of the possibility and actuality of reform.
Note too that claims of marital rape are no longer a systematic
nonstarter. A full survey would take me too far afield. But
consider the judgment of one New York court: “We find that
there is no rational basis for distinguishing between marital rape
and nonmarital rape. The various rationales which have been
asserted in defense of the exemption are either based upon
archaic notions about the consent and property rights incident
to marriage or are simply unable to withstand even the slightest
scrutiny. We therefore declare the marital exemption for rape
in the New York statute to be unconstitutional.”8 MacKinnon’s
view suggests some deep structural blindness that would make
such official pronouncements, or more generally the possibility
of reform, mysterious.
That what seems natural or necessary or fair is actually
contingent and unfair is one of the oldest moves in the book of
social criticism. I wouldn’t claim it as a distinctively liberal move.
But I would insist that liberals have been as deft as anyone else
in making the move.
Gender critiques of the law’s pretensions to fairness are
also centuries old. Here’s one of my favorites. “From the laws
and dispositions of men,” complained A Peeress of England to
her son in 1784, “women are almost in every respect made a
second sort of beings.” “Do not imagine,” she continued,
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because the law has put your wife intirely in your
power, that it is just or right she should be so. I have
heard men boast of that power, as if it was constituted
by their merit. Trace that power to its source, and
you will find it proceed from the natural propensity
Englishmen ever had for tyranny. It was men who
made the laws, and those give a man an unlimited
power over his wife.
She scornfully indicted the abuses made lawful in England
before urging that French law was better:
Any Sir John Brute may lock his wife up, and even
beat her; and there is no power to whom a wife can
apply to prevent him. He may insult and torment her
in any way he pleases—he may never pay her pin
money—he may take the lowest prostitute, place her in
his wife’s coach, by his side, travel in England with her
where she is not known, and call her his wife, whose
good name is responsible for every indecent folly the
mistress may be guilty of—A husband may lavish all
his estates and money upon women of the town, and
there is no power to restrain or correct him.9
I don’t know who this peeress was, or indeed if the author was
in fact a peeress. And her little book doesn’t explore enough
other issues in political theory that I’d be confident in any more
general characterization of her views. So I wouldn’t claim that,
like Mill and Montesquieu, she is a paradigm case of a liberal.
Maybe she’s a radical feminist, a critic of liberalism, popping
up earlier than we might have assumed possible.
But one of her more famous contemporaries sounds similar
tones. Recall Jeremy Bentham’s stinging assault on the “sinister
interests” that systematically perverted the legal system. The
central worry is that absent clever institutional design, people
will pursue their private interests and flout whatever fiduciary
obligations or more general social benevolence they should be
heeding. The young Bentham assaulted shameless self-dealing
by lawyers. He came to extend his attack on sinister interests
more broadly, not least to government officials, and eventually
to gender: he did sometimes argue for equal rights for women10
(and, for that matter, for decriminalizing sodomy).11 The form
of the argument is the same: behind the wigs and pleadings
are indefensible abuses and special privileges, not equality
or fairness. And he did extend his underlying psychological
concern about self-deception: “Many a woman has in this
way had a more correct and complete acquaintance with the
internal causes by which the conduct of her husband has been
determined, than he has had himself.”12 Men wouldn’t enjoy
the results of introspection, so they avoid it.
Jump forward to the early twentieth century and you find a
Punch columnist regularly reporting on mock legal proceedings
showing the stupid absurdities of English law. Perhaps the
most famous report—and its fame is as interesting here as its
publication—is Fardell v. Potts, where the court decides that
English law knows nothing of the possibility of a reasonable
woman.13 The very same columnist launched his parliamentary
career by fighting successfully to liberalize England’s divorce
laws. Liberalism didn’t blind him to oppressive gender dynamics
in the law. It led him to seize on them and move to reform them.
Is MacKinnon’s critique of law linked to her critique
of liberalism? I think so. Here’s how, or anyway here’s one
important link: suppose that liberalism’s deep or constitutive
commitments commit liberals to defending pornography as
a matter of free speech. Now suppose further, as MacKinnon
argues, that pornography is a linchpin, maybe the central
linchpin, in the social construction of our sense of what it is to
be a man (dominant) or a woman (submissive). If pornography

eroticizes inequality and power, and men have had the power
to construct law, they will effortlessly construct a legal system
blind in various ways to women’s oppression. True, an infamous
decision by the seventh circuit struck down the Indianapolis
ordinance championed by MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin,
which would have offered a civil remedy for women who could
show they’d been injured as a result of pornography.14 True,
leading liberal Ronald Dworkin savaged MacKinnon’s Only
Words, a brief and searing polemic about the issue.15 But I find
it hard to imagine that liberals are necessarily committed to the
stance the seventh circuit and Dworkin took. After all, Canada
has upheld laws and convictions based on more or less the
same rationale, with reasoning utterly familiar in liberal theories
of free speech.16 American first amendment law permits the
regulation of obscenity—emphatically not the same category
as MacKinnon’s pornography, in part because the category
obscenity exempts work “which, taken as a whole, [has] serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.”17 MacKinnon has
forthrightly rejected the exemption: “if a woman is subjected,
why should it matter that the work has other value?”18 But if we
construe subjected in terms of harm, nothing here need make
any liberal balk. MacKinnon offers an elaborate and intriguing
account of what’s wrong with pornography. But harms of a
quite traditional sort—rape, other violence against women,
violations of equal opportunity, and so on—are front and center
in her account.
And here’s another puzzle for how MacKinnon’s view tilts
towards the view that liberal law has to be structurally blind or
entrenched in its rejection of the views she champions. Title VII
makes discrimination on the basis of sex illegal in the workplace.
We owe to MacKinnon the thought that sexual harassment, even
when purely verbal, can qualify as discrimination.19 The law has
formally adopted that view;20 the Supreme Court has upheld it
without even pausing over free speech.21 This suggests that at
least modern American law is not as relentlessly misogynist, as
helplessly in the clutches of confused pictures of free speech,
as MacKinnon suggests. From a liberal perspective, here is yet
another jurisdictional boundary. Bosses have some authority
over workers. But that authority does not properly extend to
extorting sexual favors. Just as the Lockean state is selectively
blind to religion, so the modern workplace can’t disadvantage
women just because they’re women.
Other writers too have been interested in how gender
socialization underwrites far-ranging social inequality, also
in how the process might be hugely powerful even as we’re
blind to what’s going on. I won’t apologize for quoting one such
account at length:
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All the selfish propensities, the self-worship, the unjust
self-preference, which exist among mankind, have
their source and root in, and derive their principal
nourishment from, the present constitution of the
relation between men and women. Think what it is
to a boy, to grow up to manhood in the belief that
without any merit or any exertion of his own, though
he may be the most frivolous and empty or the most
ignorant and stolid of mankind, by the mere fact of
being born a male he is by right the superior of all
and every one of an entire half of the human race:
including probably some whose real superiority to
himself he has daily or hourly occasion to feel; but
even if in his whole conduct he habitually follows a
woman’s guidance, still, if he is a fool, he thinks that
of course she is not, and cannot be, equal in ability
and judgment to himself; and if he is not a fool, he
does worse—he sees that she is superior to him, and
believes that, notwithstanding her superiority, he is
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entitled to command and she is bound to obey. What
must be the effect on his character, of this lesson?
And men of the cultivated classes are often not aware
how deeply it sinks into the immense majority of
male minds. For, among right-feeling and well-bred
people, the inequality is kept as much as possible
out of sight; above all, out of sight of the children.
As much obedience is required from boys to their
mother as to their father: they are not permitted to
domineer over their sisters, nor are they accustomed
to see these postponed to them, but the contrary; the
compensations of the chivalrous feeling being made
prominent, while the servitude which requires them is
kept in the background. Well brought-up youths in the
higher classes thus often escape the bad influences of
the situation in their early years, and only experience
them when, arrived at manhood, they fall under the
dominion of facts as they really exist.22
The clotted prose gives it away: it’s John Stuart Mill, again
from The Subjection of Women. If this be some invidious
individualism, naturalism, voluntarism, idealism, and moralism,
well, sign me up. Less polemically, I’d have thought it a grounded
account of the social interactions that shape who we are, all for
the worse. It’s not perfect; in particular, it’s missing any account
of what the process does to little girls. But it isn’t stupid and it
isn’t somehow a mode of enquiry or analysis unavailable to
liberals. It’s an attempt to unmask what might seem natural or
necessary or divinely mandated as the wretched outcome of a
perverse but contingent practice, just as the bit about the law
of strength is an attempt to make us see pointless and cruel
injustice, not uncontroversial business as usual.

my husband lazes around. What made that women’s work?”
That is, we need to explain why these problems aren’t mere
misfortunes, but instead are injuries.
To that second kind of question, anyway, MacKinnon offers
this response: “Why some women take the step of identifying
their situation with their status as women, transforming
their discontents into grievances, is a crucial unanswered
question of feminism.”25 I’d propose this answer. There are
cultural resources available to support such observations and
inferences. We live in a world that now makes routine the
thought that we are all free and equal. But that’s the vocabulary
of liberalism. Behind the miracle of consciousness-raising
are not just the canonical likes of Montesquieu and Mill, but
generations of men and women who struggled in decidedly
liberal causes: to emancipate slaves, to advance the dignity of
labor, to get workers and women the vote, to get the state out
of the confessional booth and the bedroom, to secure physical
security and equal opportunity alike by trying to make the streets
safe for women, and on and on. MacKinnon joins all too many
in seeing liberalism as a once emancipatory but now exhausted
political theory, straitjacketing us from further progress. It’s more
plausible, alas, to think that liberalism is utopian. Regardless of
her self-understanding, regardless of her exchanges with the
likes of Strossen and Dworkin, regardless of the seventh circuit’s
ruling the Indianapolis ordinance unconstitutional, MacKinnon’s
work seems to me squarely within the liberal tradition.
Notes
1.

***

2.

3.

One last remark. MacKinnon sometimes wonders how, given
her views on how deeply and powerfully male supremacy
is entrenched, it’s possible for her to notice what’s going on
and to speak and write about it.23 As she put it in opening an
endowed lecture at Harvard, “I am . . . existentially amazed to be
here.”24 More important, perhaps, she has argued that feminist
insights became available because of consciousness-raising,
the vintage 1960s and 1970s practice of women discussing
the most mundane details of their daily lives: who does the
dishes, what happens when he wants to have sex, whether
she’s happy, and so on. In these discussions, MacKinnon
argues, women became aware that their plights were not
idiosyncratic, individual, or psychological. They came to see
them as shared and so as socially structured. They came to
see them as the potential objects of political action. So the
discussions were simultaneously of deep epistemological and
political significance.
So far so good. But now we want to know just how women
came to identify any of these issues as problems, and then,
more pointedly, as injuries. (It’s a problem, say, when a big rock
happens to slide off a mountain and slam into your head. It’s
an injury when someone intentionally throws it at you without
any justification—or when there’s some other story about why
an agent has acted culpably, if only by omission, in letting the
rock hit you.) What conceptual resources make it possible
for women to think, for instance, “I regret having to wash the
dishes and do the laundry”? MacKinnon is not likely to say that
it’s just essential to human nature to react that way. And that’s
a good thing, because I suppose no one should say things like
that. So we need to explain how women come to see such
matters as problems. And then what conceptual resources
make it possible for women to go on to think, “it is wrong,
unfair, unjust, unequal for me to do all this sort of thing while
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